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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This proceeding was initiat~d by Galen J. Ross, the person-
al representative of the decedent, to determine the validity of inter 
vivos gifts of certain shares of corporate stock made by the decedent 
David E. Ross to hi.s son E. Roderick Ross, respondent herein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Evidence propounded by respondent and by appellants David 
E. Ross and Betsy Louise Ross Rapps, the only other heirs of de-
cedent, was heard on August 24, 1979 and August 29, 1979, before 
the Honorable David B. Dee in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake Cotmty. Following that hearing, counsel for both 
parties briefed and argued relevant legal issues. After thought-
ful consideration of both factual and legal issues presented, the 
lower court held that complete and valid inter vivos gifts of the 
3ubject corporate stock were supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent E. Roderick Ross seeks an affirmance of the 
lower court's ruling which held that complete and valid inter vivos 
gifts were made by decedent to respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement fails to recite accurately and 
completely several critical pieces of evidence which, no doubt, 
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had significant persuasive impact on the trial court judge. Omit-
ted are five separate incidents showing both the decedent's clear 
intent and his objective acts in making final and complete gifts 
to respondent. 
~ Two of these incidents took place between the decedent and 
Galen Ross in February of 1978. Galen testified that one afternoon 
the decedent came into Galen's office and stated that he was going 1i 
to complete the transfer of shares in the family corporations to his 
son Rod. Around 2:00 a.m. the next morning, the decedent appeared 
at Galen's house with stock certificates ready for execution to com-
plete a transfer of shares. The certificates were made out in 
respondent's name and reflected share ownership in Insurance Invest-
ment, National Housing and Finance Syndicate, and Equitable Invest-
ment. At decedent's request, Galen, as an officer of each of the 
companies, executed the certificates. Galen recalls that the dec-
edent then said to him, 
"Now that I have got this gift to Rod taken care 
of, the stock transferred to Rod, I want you to 
make me my will and I want you to do it tomorrow." 
(R. 217, 218, 230, and 231). (Emphasis added). 
Another important conversation took place around February 
18, 1978 between the decedent and his niece, Di·a.~me Ross Worthen. 
The decedent told Dianne that on the previous day he had made gifts 
of stock in Equitable Investment, Insurance Investment, and National 
Housing and Finance Syndicate to Rod. He then related in some de-
tail the reasons why he had made these gifts. He had worked closely 
-2-
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in the family business with his son Rod and he was proud of Rod's 
performance. Apparently, so Dianne relates, the decedent also ex-
pressed some dismay that this other two children had not visited 
him in Utah, especially during the period of his final illness. 
(R. 310-311). 
Also omitted is the significant testimony of Rod Ross that 
sometime in February of 19 7 8 he was- handed some of the certificates 
of the shares being given to him. As the transcript reveals: 
"Q: (by Mr. Wheeler) Did you have any of the stock 
except for the Ross Brothers Corporation stock hand-
ed to you in person where you actually took the stock? 
A: Actually physically held the stock? 
Q: Yes. 
A: One or two of either Insurance Investment, 
Equitable Investment or National Housing, I had 
actual physical contact with, yes. 
Q: One or two of those? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: You don't know which one? 
A: ~o. 
Q: And who - from whom did you obtain this stock? 
A: From my father. 
Q: Do you recall when that occurred? 
A: The middle of February, 1978. 
(R. 274-275). 
Appellants also fail to describe an important portion of the 
-3-
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organization meeting of Ross Brothers Corporation. Both Galen Ross 
and Dianne Worthen testified that Rod was handed a certificate for 
250 shares of the Ross Brothers stock. In response to Dianne's 
question why Rod was being given so many shares, David Ross re-
plied that it was his intent to give Rod a larger portion of the 
shares which he held in the family corporations. He also explain-
ed his motive as follows: he was giving Rod, by inter vivos gifts, 
one-fourth of all of his share holdings in the family corporations; 
he would then leave the balance, or three-fourths of his original 
holdings, to his three children in equal shares so that each child 
would take one-third of the remaining shares. The effect of this 
plan of distribution would be to give Rod, after receipt of both 
the lifetime gifts and the testamentary distribution, one-half of 
his father's share holdings in the family corporations. (Testimony 
of Galen J. Ross, R. 213-214; testimony of Dianne Ross Worthen, R. 
308-309). 
The evidence is clear that the decedent actually did what 
he said he would do. With each of the five companles, Rod re-
ceived exactly one-fourth of the shares belonging to his father 
at the. time of each gift. After distribution of the shares still :~ 
belonging to his father's estate, Rod will own one-half of his 
father's original share holdings in the family companies. (Find-
ings of Fact 23(c), R. 116-117; Exhibit 38). 
-4-
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court correctly interpreted the evidence 
and properly applied Utah law when it held that decedent made valid 
inter vivos gifts of stock to his son Rod Ross. 
The ruling of the trial court was clearly correct on all 
points of Utah inter vivos gift law which holds that a valid gift 
·.requires (1) a clear intent and (2) some demonstrative act showing 
: the donor's relinquishment of ownership in the property being given.l 
This Court articulated these requirements in Helner State 
: Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.2d 359, 365 (1938): 
[The donor] must have intended that some title, 
either legal or equitable, should pass to [the 
donee] during his lifetime, and in addition to 
merely having such intention, he must have per-
formed some act or acts which indicated his in-
tention to pass such title to her during his 
lifetime. (Citations omitted; emphasis added). 
To the same effect, Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 
471, 286 P. 638, 643 (1930) stated that the donor must intend that 
t either the legal or equitable title pass to the donee during the 
donor's life tit:le and that " [ t] he re must be some act performed by 
.the donor which indicates his intention to vest in the donee 
: some right to the property during the life of the donor." (Emphasis 
added). The Court went on to note, "The courts are not in agreement 
·as to what acts are necessary for a donor to perform in order that 
1Acceptance of a gift that is beneficial to the donee is ordinarily 
presllllled. Sims v. George, 24 Utah 2d 102, 466 P.2d 831, 833 n.7 
(1970); See also, Annotation,23A.L.R.2d 1171 (1952). 
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h:t.s intention shall be given effect." Id. 
In deciding whether the requirements have been met, this 
Court has not engaged in mechanical analysis of artificial cate-
gories, but has focused on all the facts and circumstances present- ii 
ed at trial. 
'As pointed out by the courts, each case in which 
a gift is involved must, to a large extent, be 
controlled by its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances. While it is true that certain forms of 
law must be complied with, yet it is also true 
that the intention of the donor must also receive 
due consideration and effect, and if in making a 
gift he has substantially complied with the latter, 
and it is clear that he intended to make a gift, his 
intentions must prevail.' 
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320,81 P.2d 359, 366 (1938) 
quoting from Boyle v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136 (1914). ::! 
Accord, Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340,124 P. 765, 768 
(1912). ~! 
Cons is tent with the approach in Crus, this Court has held ':'.~ 
on numerous occasions that delivery itself is essentially a matter 
of intent. When the Court must determine whether an act is suffi-
cient to constitute "delivery," the intent of the donor in perform- ::: 
ing the act is critical. 
'[Delivery] is the act, however evidenced, by 
which the instrument takes effect and title there-
by passes.' 
Mower v. Mower, 93 Utah 390, 288 P. 914 (1924)(citation omitted). 
On both the necessary points of Utah law, respondent car-
ried his burden of proof. The evidence on intent was overwhelming, 
and appellants concede that "this Court could find substantial evi- ~: 
-6-
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dence to support the lower court's conclusion of intent and accept-
ance." (Brief of Appellants, p. 12). 
The record is equally replete with undisputed evidence of 
clear and demonstrative acts by the decedent showing that he divested 
himself completely of ownership of the shares being given to Rod. 
First, the decedent did everything necessary to make com-
plete transfers of the stock on the corporate books and records of 
each of the corporations. (Finding of Fact No. 22, R. 116). In each 
case the decedent surrendered his certificate; the old certificate 
in the decedent's name was cancelled; a new certificate was issued 
in Rod's name and another in the name of his father for the balance 
of the shares; all proper transfers were made in stock record books; 
and, in those cases where stock ledger sheets were kept_ for individual 
share holders, appropriate entries were made. (Findings of Fact Nos. 
:3,4,5,6,10,14,15,16,17,18,19)20,21,22; R. 111-116). 
Appellants suggest that decedent's meticulous completion 
,of the transfers on the stock record books does not prove that the 
decedent wished to divest himself of ownership of those shares. 
They argue that decedent could have "undone" all of these trans-
actions. 
Their argument is curious. There is no evidence in the 
.record that the decedent ever attempted to "undo" any of these 
transactions. Moreover, if his father really had only tentative 
thoughts about making gifts to Rod, why would he have gone to the 
-7-
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trouble of making the transfers complete. 
Their argument is also logically deficient. Appellants 
assert that because there is a remote possibility decedent could 
have done the opposite of what he actually did, one should infer 
that he intended the opposite of what he did. Without proof, 
the argument means nothing. 
Second, the certificate for the Ross Brothers shares and 
one or possibly two certificates in National Housing and Finance 
Syndicate, Equitable Investment, and Insurance Investment were 
actually physically handed to Rod Ross. The Ross Brothers certi-
ficate was handed to Rod by Galen Ross at that company's organi-
zation meeting in December of 1977. (R. 213-214). Sometime 
in February of 1978, Rod's father handed him one or two of the 
certificates for the Insurance Investment, Equitable Investment, and 
National Housing and Finance Syndicate shares being given to Rod. 
(R. 274-275). 
Third, while the decedent had physical possession of the 
certificates representing the disputed shares at the time of his 
death, the record reveals that such custody was consistent with 
gifts of the stock having been completed. Under the circumstances, 
the decedent's custodial care of the certificates does not indicate 
that he wished to control the shares, to retain ownership, or to 
revoke the gifts made to Rod. Rather, the nature of the custody 
demonstrates that the decedent treated those certificates as if 
-8-
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ownership of the shares was vested in Rod Ross. To understand 
the significance of the decedent's custody of the certificates, 
it is helpful to briefly review the evidence about the Ross family 
arrangement for keeping the family stock certificates. 
It is important to note, first, that the decedent maintain-
ed the certificates for all members of the family. He kept the 
certificates of his brother Galen; those of his nephews and nieces, 
the children of his deceased brother, Ray; his own certificates; and 
those of Rod. (Findings of Fact Nos. 24, 25, R. 118). Thus, he had 
custody of a large number of family certificates to which he clearly 
had no claim of ownership or control. His custody of the certifi-
cates belonging to, say, Galen did not, of course, mean that the 
decedent had any claim to the shares represented by these certifi-
cates. Indeed, the only fair inference to be drawn is that the de-
cedent kept Rod's certificates because he kept all the family 
certificates, and not because he either felt he "owned" or controlled 
the shares or because he wished to revoke the gifts to Rod. 
Moreover, nothing distinguished the physical custody of 
Rod's certificates from custody of certificates belonging to other 
family members; David Ross followed the same procedure for all cer-
tificates in his custody. Certificates of each. family member were 
placed in an envelope with a notation as to the name of the owner, 
name of the company, the certificate ntnnber, and the number of shares. 
This procedure was followed with Galen's shares, with Dianne's shares, 
-9-
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with Earl's shares; it was also followed with Rod's shares. 
Finally, Rod exercised all the prerogatives of ownership 
and control on the Equitable Life and Casualty shares during his 
father's lifetime. He received and spent cash dividends. He re-
ceived a stock dividend. He also attended shareholder's meetings 
and voted the shares in his name. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 7,8, 
R. 113-114). 
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, together with respond·: 
ent's evidence of donative intent, the trial court concluded that 
David Ross' gifts of corporate stock to his son Rod were valid and 
complete. That decision is entirely consistent with Utah inter 
vivos gift law discussed earlier in this brief. 
B. Appellants' statement of the Utah law of inter vivos 
gifts is incorrect. 
Appellants do not dispute that (1) David Ross had a clear 
present intent to divest himself of ownership of the shares of 
stock in question and that (2) he performed numerous acts to carry 
out his stated intent, including surrender of his own stock 
certificates, issuance of new certificates in the donee's name, and 
changing of the corporate books to reflect the change in ownership. 
Rather, appellants urge this Court to rule as a matter of law that 
an attempted inter vivas gift of corporate stock fails where the 
donor neglects to perform a symbolic ritual of manual delivery com-
parable to the ancient rite of "livery of seisen." 
-10-
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The argument is made in two presumably different ways. Appel-
lants first assert that respondent has failed to establish the 
validity of the eifts by clear and convincing evidence. Second, 
appellants contend that the law of a majority of jurisdictions, in-
cluding Utah, requires actual physical delivery of stock certificates 
for a valid inter vivos gift of corporate stock. 
Both of these arguments fail. The first reveals a mistmder-
standing of both the nature of the clear and convincing standard 
and also of the degree of proof necessary to satisfy the standard. 
The second argument is a misstatement of the law. 
(1) Clear and convincing evidence supports the facts found 
by the lower court. 
Appellants correctly point out that under Utah law the 
donee has the burden of proving an inter vivos gift by "clear 
and convincing" evidence. Appellants do not, however, support their 
proposition that respondent failed to meet this burden. Indeed, 
appellants' argument on the point is unclear and confusing. 
Since appellants do not dispute any of the basic facts 
fotmd by the trial court, their argument on burden of proof can 
1 only mean one of two things: 
(a) That respondent failed to prove an essential 
element of his case; or 
(b) That as a matter of law respondent did not 
offer proof adequate to satisfy the "clear and convinc-
ing" standard. 
-11-
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If appellants mean the former, they are merely restating 
their assertion that Utah law requires a manual deliver of stock 
certificates being given by decedent. This argument raises a question 
of law. Appellants' position, as discussed in other parts of this 
brief, is incorrect. 
If appellants mean the second alternative, they suggest that 
the "clear and convincing" standard is more burdensome than it 
really is. Appellants obliquely suggest that the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard approximates the standard of beyond a reason-
able doubt. This is, of course, an inaccurate statement of the 
matter. 
The clear and convincing standard requires that the proponent : 
of disputed facts convince the trier of fact "that the existence of 
the disputed facts are very highly probable . " Lovett v. 
Continental Bank and Trust Company, 4 Utah 2d 701, 286 P.2d 1065 
(1955). This standard is a comparative degree of certainty higher 
thant the "preponderance of evidence" standard, yet lower than the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Id. 2 
2cf. Justice Wolfe in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 
194, 204 (1949): 
That proof is convincing which carries with it, 
not only the power to persuade the mind as to the 
probable truth or correctness of the fact is pur-
ports to prove, but has the element of clinching 
such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing 
proof clinches what might otherwise be only prob-
able to the mind. 
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Significantly, while defining the comparative degrees of 
certainty of proof, this Court has recognized that whenever facts 
are disputed, findings of fact must be based on probabilities rather 
than on absolute certainties. Id. 
The duty to determine whether evidence is clear and con-
vincing rests with the trial court. After hearing the evidence 
t' in this matter, the lower court determined that respondent had met 
the requisite degree of proof of the facts enumerated in the find-
m; ings. On appeal, the test of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
!~support the lower court's findings is whether the evidence is 
~! reasonably sufficient. Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Company, 
4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955). See also, Holman v. 
'~I 
Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340, 124 P. 765 (1912). 
(2) Actual physical delivery of the certificates is not 
required for a valid inter vi vos gift of stock. 
v. 
Appellants argue that Utah and a majority of other juris-
, dictions require manual deli very of certificates to complete a 
1li 
valid inter vivos gift of stock. As their brief states at page 20: 
~: 
"Thus the overwelming majority of states require 
an actual transfer and delivery of the stock 
certificate itself before a gift of stock is dee~ed. 
to have occurred. Utah is numbered among the maJority 
of states which have adopted this requirement." 
The Utah cases cited by appellants simply do not support 
their proposition. Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Company, 40 
Utah 371, 121 P. 741 (1912) held that an oral order by the deced-
ent to the corporation to trans fer his stock ownership on the corpor-
ate records to his son's name was sufficient for a valid transfer 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the stock where no certificates of stock were ever issued. 
Appellants' version of the holding of Rasmussen is obviously 
incorrect since no certificates were ever issued. 
The two remaining cases cited by appellants do not even 
deal with inter vivos gifts. Both Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 
161 P. 448 (1916) and Gowans v. Rockport Irrigation Company, 77 Utah 
198, 293 P. 4 (1930) hold that in a commercial setting, actual physi· 
I 
cal delivery of certificates presenting shares of stock is sufficient 
to transfer title. 
Contrary to appellants' assertion, a majority of jurisdiction 
hold that a complete gift of stock can be made without an actual 
manual delivery of the certificates. Annotation, 23 A.L.R.2d 1171, 
1174 (1952). At least thirty states, as well as several federal 
courts, have adopted this view. Id. 
rule: 
38 Am.Jur.2d, Gifts, Section 51 (1968), states the majority 
Generally, there is a complete gift of 
corporate stock where, by the direction of 
its owner, it has been transferred to the donee 
on the books of the corporation and a new certi-
ficate issued in the name of the donee, or where a 
certificate is issued in the first instance in 
the name of the donee, even though the certificate 
so issued is retained by the donor or t·he corporation, 
and not delivered to the donee. Thus, where a 
donor causes a certificate of stock to be issued 
in the name of the donee, retaining possession 
thereof himself, but at all times regarding 
the certificate as the property of the donee and 
his own possession as that of a trustee of the 
donee, the delivery to himself as trustee of the 
doneee is sufficient to complete the gift. Similarly, 
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a completed gift of corporate stock is made by caus-
ing it to be issued in the name of another, even 
though the certificates are not detached from the 
stock book and are not delivered to the donee, but 
remain in the custody of the corporation, and the 
donee is ignorant of the transaction at the time. 
(Citations omitted.) 
ii Accord, Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 1077 (1935). 
I 
lli In a frequently cited case, Phillips v. Plastridge, 
l• 107 Vt. 267, 179 A. 157 (1935), a widow sought to compel an alleged 
r 
rn donee to account for proceeds from stocks the widow claimed to be 
part of the decedent's estate. The facts showed that decedent 
1~had conveyed property to a granite company in exchange for 121 
,shares of its initial capital stock. He di~ected that 100 of those 
~: 
l'. shares be issued in the name of his daughter. The certificates 
1 
were so issued, but remained in 
i; 
the possession of the corporation 
until after the donor's death. The lower court found that there 
was a completed gift from the decedent, Phillips, to his daughter. 
j~ 
Affirming on appeal, the Vermont court reasoned: 
So there was [a completed gift]. Phillips 
had divested himself of all right and title to 
the stock and the complete ownership had passed 
to his daughter. It was his voluntary act, 
affording an inference of the existence of 
a donative intent. Under the circumstances, 
a manual delivery of the certificates was not 
necessary. In Roberts' Appeal, 85 Pa. ·8~, 86, 
it is said: "The gift is complete by the.de-
livery of the thing itself, for transferring 
the shares to her upon the books of the company 
is putting her in complete possession of the 
thing assigned, and clothing her with the complete 
legal title. It stands in the place of a de-
livery. Such an act performs precisely the 
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office which an actual delivery would perform if 
it were a chattel. It is as complete a delivery as 
the nature of the thing will admit of. There can 
be no clearer evidence of a design to part with 
the right of property in favor of another than an 
absolute transfer of the legal title to her for her 
own use. . . . The certificates were but second-
ary evidence of her ownership, and only useful 
for purposes of transfer. They were nothing more 
than the official declaration by the company 
of what already appeared on their books. There 
was here no locus poenitentiae. He [the donor] 
could not have used the certificates, nor could 
any one have used them except Miss Foster [the 
donee]. 
179 A. at 158. 
Similarly, McClements v. UcClements, 411 Pa. 257, 191 
A.2d 814 (1963),was an action by a widow seeking to have a con-
structive trust for her benefit charged on seventy-five shares 
of corporate stock held by her sons. The evidence showed that 
the father had transferred the ownership of the stock on the books 
of the family corporation from himself to one of his sons and 
had directed that son to distribute the shares equally among the 
three sons. There was no evidence of actual delivery of the 
certificates. On appeal from a judgment for defendants, the 
plaintiff argued that lack of physical delivery was decisive on the 
issue of validity of the gift. The Pennsylvania court held that 
transfer on the corporate books was a delivery sufficient to 
divest the owner of all dominion over the property. The gift was, 
therefore, upheld. 
Simonton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore. 50, 115 P.2d 316 (1941), pre-
sents a fact situation strikingly similar to the facts before 
this Court. There, in suits brought by two daughters of the 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
decedent for declaratory judgment of ownership of shares of stock 
in a family corporation, the daughters presented evidence showing 
that their father had surrendered his certificates to the corpo-
ration, had them canceled, and directed issuance of new stock 
certificates in the name of the daughters. Further, the evidence 
showed that although the father kept possession of the certif-
icates representing the disputed shares, he had told several 
witnesses that he had made gifts of the shares to his daughters. 
One daughter had no knowledge of the gift until after her father's 
death. The lower court found the gifts valid and complete. 
On appeal, opponents of the gifts argued that the 
father's failure to deliver the certificates and his custody 
of them during his lifetime rendered the gifts ineffectual. 
Addressing this issue, the Oregon court stated: 
The contention that the manual delivery 
of these stock certificates by the donor to 
the donee was necessary to constitute a valid 
gift is not well taken. 
It must be remembered that the usual and 
ordinary way of making a gift of corporate 
stock is for the holder of a certificate to 
indorse the same and to deliver it to the 
donee. In that case, the delivery of the 
indorsed certificate is essential to the 
validity of the gift. Here, the tr~n~fer was 
made by delivering up his own certi·ficates 
and having new certificates issued to the 
donees in lieu thereof. Therefore, the 
transfer of the stock was rightfully made 
and completed, and vested in the transferees 
the legal title to the stock. For t~at rea-
son a manual delivery of the newly issued sto~k was not necessary to complete the gift. 
115 P.2d at 318. 
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After reviewing numerous cases supporting the law quoted 
above, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. 
In Fesmire v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina, 
267 N.C. 589, 148 S.E.2d 589 (1966), a donor brought suit to re-
cover possession of stock she claimed by reason of inter vivos 
gift. The facts were tmdisputed. The donor had endorsed stock 
certificates issued to him and placed them in an envelope bearing 
the donee's name which was then placed in a safety deposit box 
in his bank. Moreover, a brother of the deceased donor testified 
that in a conversation with the deceased, the deceased stated 
that he "had given" the disputed shares to the donee, his long time 
secretary and fiancee. 
On this evidence, the trial court upheld the gift. 
The North Carolina court affirmed, noting: 
It is not essential, however, that the article 
be placed beyond the physical power of the donor 
to retake it, as is illustrated by the case of a 
gift of coins to a child by dropping them in a 
container recognized as the property of the child 
though the containe~ itself, remains in the home 
of the donor and thus subject to his physical con-
trol. Furthermore, when there has been an actual 
transfer of possession with the requisite intent, 
the gift is not defeated by the subsequent return of 
the article to the possession of the donor for 
safekeeping, or its return to a contain-~r or place 
of deposit owned and controlled by the donor. 
148 S.E.2d at 592 (citations omitted). 
Moore v. Van Tassell, 58 Wyo. 121, 126 P.2d 9 (1942), 
dealt with yet another similar fact situation. There, plaintiff 
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brought suit for declaratory judgment that he held ownership in 
certain stocks allegedly given to him by his stepfather. The 
evidence showed that the deceased stepfather during his life-
time had directed cancellation of his certificate for shares 
in a family corporation of which he was president and majority 
shareholder and issuance of a new certificate made out in the 
plaintiff's name. The new certificate was signed by both the 
deceased donor and the secretary of the corporation as officers, 
but the stepfather allowed the certificate to remain in the 
secretary's safety deposit box throughout his lifetime. As in 
the cases discussed earlier, there was no evidence of physical 
delivery of the certificate to the donee. The lower court found 
for the plaintiff donee. 
On appeal, the Wyoming court reviewed numerous cases 
from other jurisdictions and secondary authorities that had 
directly addressed the issue of whether manual delivery of 
certificates is necessary to complete a gift of stock. It 
then affirmed the trial court's decision, adopting the rule 
that: 
There is a complete gift of corporate 
stock where, by the direction of its owner, 
it has been transferred to the donee .. on the 
books of the corporation, and a new certif-
icate issued in the name of the donee, or a 
certificate is issued in the first instance 
in the name of the donee, although the 
certificate so issued is retained by the 
donor or the corporation, and not delivered 
to the donee. 
126 P.2d at 14, quoting from 99 A.L.R. 1077, at 1080. 
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Applying the principles announced in cases discussed 
and the rule quoted above, the court ruled: 
It is plain that Mr. Van Tassell [the 
donor] did all he could to place the legal 
title to the shares of stock evidenced by 
Certificate No. 8, aforesaid, in Granville 
Moore [the donee] when the result Mr. Van 
Tassell desire to accomplish is considered. 
126 P.2d at 14. 
Likewise, in Owens v. Sun Oil Company, 482 F.2d 564 
(10th Cir. 1973), the Tenth Circuit ruled that under Arkansas 
law physical delivery of a stock certificate was not a prerequis-
ite to consummation of the gift of stock. In Owens, the achninistra-
trix of the donee's estate brought action against the corporation 
for conversion when the corporation canceled stock in decedent's 
name and reissued it to the donor, an aunt of the deceased. Prior 
to the death of her nephew, the aunt had directed the corporation 
to cancel a certain stock certificate in her name and to reissue 
a certificate in her nephew's name. On the same day that the 
new certificate arrived at the aunt's bank, the nephew was killed. 
The corporation appealed from a jury verdict sustaining 
the validity of the gift, claiming that physical delivery is a pre-
requisite to consummation of a gift of stock. ·The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the validity of the gift, holding that "issuance of the 
stock in the name of {-the donee] along with evidence of [the aunt's] 
intent, was sufficient to sustain the burden of showing intent to 
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make a present gift and effective delivery." 482 F.2d at 568. 
(3) Commercial statutes do not preempt the law of inter 
vivos gifts. 
Appellants' argument that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 
and the Uniform Commercial Code require that a donor make actual 
manual delivery of certificates of stock to his donee to effec-
tuate a valid inter vivos gift is equally unpersuasive. Although 
cases cited by appellants in support of their proposition do men-
tion the commercial statute in their reasoning, those statutes do 
not appear to have been decisive. In each instance, both dona-
tive intent and deli very were found lacking. 
Most jurisdictions that have directly considered the appli-
capability of commercial statutes to the law of gifts have concluded 
if! 
that such statutes are not controlling on the issue of what acts 
t
1
1 
are sufficient for deli very of a gift. 
Ir: 
For example, the Illinois Court in Frey v. Wubbena, 
di 
' 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N. E. 2d 850 ( 1962) , disapproved the application 
'1~ 
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath, 
I 
· 187 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1951), a case cited in Brief of Appellants 
rn
1 h f 1 · at page 22. The issue in Frey was whether t e act o p acing 
~!title to corporate stocks in joint tenancy was a sufficient 
11 act to constitute delivery necessary for a gift of the shares of 
~stock. The donees, daughters of decedent, relied on Chicago 
&Title and Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N.E. 319 (1928), 
i~which held that transfer of registration of stocks on the cor-
ii:porate books was sufficient to effectuate a gift where a father 
had delivered the certificates to the corporation for reissue to 
his daughter but had thereafter retained the new certificates. 
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On the other hand, the widow of decedent relied on Shinsaku and 
the Uniform Commercial Code to defeat the gifts for want of actual 
delivery of the certificates. 
In refusing to apply the commercial statutes to a gift 
question, the court stated: 
We have read with interest the case of 
Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath, (7th Cir.) 187 
F.2d 753, which adopts the view that the 
doctrine of the Ward case is no longer the 
law in Illinois because of the effect of the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1961, chap. 32, par. 416) which has since 
been replaced by the Uniform Commercial 
Code (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1961, chap. 26, par. 8 
-- 309) effective July 1, 1962. We do not 
regard the act as being intended to govern 
a gift situation such as that presented in 
Ward or here. 
185 N.E.2d at 857 (emphasis added). 
The Iowa Court in Kintzinger v. Millin, 254 Iowa 173, 
117 N.W.2d 68, (1962), took a similar position. That case was 
a probate proceeding contesting the validity of a testator's inter 
vivos gift of 3,700 shares of corporate stock to his son. The 
trial court based its decision that the gift was void on the sole 
grotmd that delivery was ineffective where the testator had endorsed.:: 
certificates representing the stock, had directed that the certifi-
cates be sent to the corporation and reissued in the name of his 
son, and had executed an assignment; but where the certificates 
had not been reissued, the book change had not been made, and act-
ual delivery of the certificates to the son had not been made by 
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the donor. 
Appellees argued that prior case law holding actual delivery 
not essential to a gift of corporate stock had been overruled by 
the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. In response to 
this argument, the court reasoned: 
[A]lthough some decisions are to the contrary 
by what we think is the weight of authority 
which we are persuaded to follow, the rights 
of the parties as between themselves are not 
affected by the provisions of the Uniform Act. 
They were enacted for the protection of the 
corporation, so it might safely deal in payment 
of dividends or otherwise with the person in 
whose name the stock was registered. Hausfelder 
v. Security-First National Bank, 77 Cal.App.Zd 
478, 176 P.2d 84, 88; In re Antkowski's Estates, 
supra, 286 Ill. App. 184, 3 N.E.2d 132, 137; In 
re Hill's Estate, 30 Ill.App.2d 243, 174 N.E."20 
rn, 235;· State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 76 
So. 557, 564; Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., supra, 
132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917, 920; Gugle v. Gugle, 
Ohio App., 78 N.E.2d 585, 587; In re Conne!!'s 
Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 A. 503, 38 A.L.R. 1362, 
1365. . 
117 N.W.2d at 76. 
The court also noted that, even if applicable, the 
, Uniform Act does not require manual delivery to the donee person-
-, ally and nor does the law independent of the statute. Therefore, 
~ 
relinquishment of the certificates to the corporation with the 
~ 
~ intent to vest ownership in the donee was as effectual as manual 
~ 
delivery. The trial court decision was reversed on this basis. 
Henderson v. Tagg, 68 Wash.2d 188, 412 P.2d 112 (1966), 
is another case which held the Uniform Stock Transfer Act inapplic-
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able in a gift case. In an action by the donee of a gift against thE 
executors of the estate, the parties stipulated at trial that the 
donor intended to make a gift of the corporate stock to the donee 
and that he had delivered stock certificates representing 300 
shares of stock to the corporation with instructions to transfer 
ownership to the donee. The trial court entered jdugment for the 
plaintiff-donee, ruling that the donor had done all that was nec-
essary for the transfer of the stock. 
On appeal, the executors relied on the Uniform Stock Trans· 
fer Act provisions requiring delivery of stock certificates to 
effectuate a transfer of ownership of stock. After noting that a 
strict reading of the Act would require some sort of manual trans· 
fer of the certificates, the Washington court stated: 
-It seems to us that such a rule is unduly 
restrictive in its interpretation of the under-
lying purpose of the Uniform Stock Transfer 
Act, and unnecessarily rigid in the application 
of its pertinent provisions. In this respect, 
the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court in the 
recent case of Kintzinger v. Millin is persuasive. 
412 P.2d at 115 (citation omitted). 
Id. 
The court concluded: 
We are, therefore, persuaded to apply the 
more flexible rules of personal property 
law in ascertaining whether or not a gift 
was consununated. . . . 
The trial court decision finding the gifts valid was 
affirmed. 
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In McClements v. McClements, 411 Pa. 257, 191 A.2d 814 
(1963),a case discussed earlier in this brief, appellant relied 
on the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to support her argument that 
the actual delivery of certificates of ownership is essential 
to effectuate a gift of stock. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this appeal in 
the following language: 
While it is true that the Pennsylvania Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act of May 5, 1911, 
P.L. 126, §21, 15 P.S. §321, (Repealed 1953), 
provided that a person to whom a certificate 
of stock is issued was to be regarded as the 
real owner, this was not conclusive of the 
rights between a donor and a donee: Connell's 
Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 A. 503, 38 A.L.R. 1362 
(1925). See also, Chatple's Estate, 332 Pa. 
168 2 A.2d 719, 121 A .. R. 422 (1938). 
191 A.2d at 816. 
The court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the lower court's conclusion that the deceased had intended to make 
the gift of stock to his sons and that transfer of ownership on the 
corporate books was sufficient delivery notwithstanding the lack 
of evidence of actual delivery of the certificates. 
While this Court has never directly considered whether 
or not the Uniform Stock Transfer Act or the Uniform Connnercial 
Code should govern gift situations, Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 
41, 89 P.2d 235 (1939), decided a similar issue and is instructive 
here. 
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In Jackson, the trial court upheld an inter vivos gift 
of an automobile claimed by plaintiff to have been given to her 
as a wedding present by defendant's intestate. On appeal, defendant 
argued that the gift was void as a matter of law because the owner-
ship registration had not been transferred in accordance with a motor 
vehicle registration statute which provided that "delivery of any 
vehicle . . . shall be deemed not to have been made and title thereto 
shall be deemed not to have passed, and said intended transfer shall 
be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid" unless the regis-
tration was transferred in the office of the State Tax Cotmnission. 
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Utah Supreme 
Court looked to the purpose and scope of the motor vehicle statute 
to determine that it did not govern the gift question presented 
in that case: 
In the light of the whole chapter it is evi-
dent that its provisions were written to pro-
tect innocent purchasers and third parties from 
fraud but was not intended to be controlling 
as between the parties to the transaction. 
It may well be doubted that the legislature 
could make mandatory any such formalities as 
a prerequisite to transfer of title as between 
the parties. It can of course prescribe such 
rules to be effective as to third parties . . . . 
89 P.2d at 237. 
Jackson and the preceding cases from o·t.her jurisdictions 
are consistent with the scope and purpose of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code and with Utah inter vivos gift law. The Commer-
cial Code was intended to govern commercial transactions only and 
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~ 
ownership and transfer provisions were enacted to protect corporations. 
There is no indication that the Legislature intended that the Code 
preempt the common law of inter vivos gifts which does not specify 
that particular acts be performed to consummate a gift of stock. 
Rather, gift law looks to all the facts and circumstances sur-
ro'IID.ding a gift to determine whether the donor has performed acts 
to carry out his intent to transfer ownership from himself to the 
donee. 
Of course, even if the commercial statutes were applicable 
to gifts of stock, provisions requiring "delivery" are not necessarily 
limited to actual manual delivery of certificates from the donor 
to the donee. "Delivery" means voluntary transfer of possession. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-l-201(14)(1953). Delivery 
occurs when a purchaser or a person designated by him acquires pos-
session of a security. Id., Section 70A-8-313. Thus, delivery 
can occur where the donor voltmtarily transfers possession from 
himself to the donee, even where the donee is not in actual pos-
session of the certificates of stock. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Rod Ross respectfully submits that this Court 
should affirm the judgment of the trial court for the following 
reasons: 
1. Each of the gifts of stock made by the decedent to 
Rod Ross was valid and complete; 
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2. All of the disputed shares a~e the property of Rod 
Ross; 
3. Respondent met his burden of proving these inter 
vivos gifts by clear and convincing evidence; and 
4. Appellants have offered no persuasive reason to 
reverse the trial court's judgment. 
This result would, no doubt, be the result intended by 
the decedent. Without a compelling reason to void these gifts, 
this Court should give full effect to the decedent's intent. 
DATED this :.li_ day of July, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Kenneth W. Yeates 
Patricia M. Leith 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Respondent, E. Roderick 
Ross 
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